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FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL-
PLACING RESPONSIBILITY
Stanley Mosk*
The President of the American Bar Association has appointed
a panel of eleven prominent lawyers and judges under the chairman-
ship of a Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court to serve as an
advisory committee on fair trial and free press. Previously the A.B.A.
launched a project for the formulation of minimum national stand-
ards for the administration of criminal justice in the United States.
A special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York is working under a Ford Foundation grant to study
the impact of radio and television on the administration of justice.
The National Conference of State Trial Judges has proposed
a research project on the effect of publicity on juries, including ex-
perimental trials and interviews with actual jurors.
A committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors
is considering the same problem, as is the Brookings Institution.
In Massachusetts 26 of 40 daily newspapers have subscribed to a
voluntary code prepared by the bar and press. In Philadelphia a
similar code is being prepared by the Bar Association.
The United States Attorney for the Connecticut District issued
an order to all federal prosecutors under his direction to make no
public statements before or during trials that might be considered
prejudicial to defendants.
The Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Ken-
nedy made as one of its twelve recommendations "that the representa-
tives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the news media
work together to establish ethical standards concerning the collection
and presentation of information to the public so that there will be no
interference with pending criminal investigations, court proceedings,
or the right of individuals to a fair trial."
All of these and similar activities throughout the country have
served to focus attention upon the problem of assuring to defendants
a fair trial before an uninfluenced jury in this day of keenly aggres-
sive media of communication.
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California; former Attorney General of
the State of California; former Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Cali-
fornia.
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After all the surveys are completed, and all the resolutions
adopted, however, the ultimate determination that must be made is
where primary responsibility rests. A newspaper prints or a television
station broadcasts the purported confession of a defendant accused
of a 'heinous offense, including the defendant's previous criminal
record. Assuming arguendo that the defendant is thus prevented
from receiving a fair trial in the community in which he was arrested,
upon whom is the onus and responsibility to be placed for this
denial? Is it upon the newspaper which printed, or the television
station which broadcast, the information? Is it upon the defendant
himself who may have naively or designedly permitted 'himself to
be queried by representatives of the media? Is it upon defense
counsel, if the defendant had representation? Is it upon the prose-
cuting attorney who may have encouraged or acquiesced in the
interview or the release of information to the media? Or is it upon
the law enforcement custodian of the defendant, the police chief,
sheriff, or jailer?
In order to prevent prospective denials of a fair trial we must
abandon the broadside approach and try to establish basic responsi-
bility for protection of defendant's rights. It is upon that subject that
I shall offer some cursory observations.
Beginning with the case of Bridges v. California,' the Supreme
Court of the United States has developed a body of law, based upon
the free speech and press provision of the United States Constitu-
tion, that all but insulates news media from responsibility to the
courts. Many commentators, considering the cases developed upon
the Bridges theme, have concluded that absent statutory modifica-
tions or constitutional amendments the courts are powerless to
punish news media for publishing, editorializing, or otherwise acting
so as to affect the rights of a defendant or the state to a fair trial.
In 1951 the Supreme Courts of California and the United States
decided the cases of People v. Stroble,2 and Stroble v. California.'
Defendant Stroble was convicted of first degree murder of a six-
year-old girl and sentenced to death. While being transported to the
district attorney's office, he confessed his guilt in a conversation
with the accompanying police officer. He repeated this confession
in the district attorney's office during an interrogation which lasted
about two hours. While the confession was being made, the district
attorney released to the press details of the confessions and also an-
nounced his belief that the defendant was guilty and sane. At the
1 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
36 Cal. 2d 615 (1951).
3 343 U.S. 181 (1951).
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time of defendant's arrest and at the time of his trial, there was
widespread public excitement and extensive coverage by newspapers,
radio and television, concerning crimes against children, and de-
fendant's crime in particular. This was probably the first significant
instance of television coverage, and may have established techniques
used for TV commentaries thereafter. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, although deprecating the extensive news publicity and the
actions of the district attorney in releasing the "play-by-play bulle-
tins during the course of the defendant's confession," held that there
was not a sufficient showing of prejudice to require a reversal of the
conviction.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Stroble v. Cali-
fornia,4 upheld the conviction and substantially adopted the language
of the Supreme Court of California. Of particular interest is this ex-
pression which comments on the release of the confession by the
district attorney:
While we may deprecate the action of the district attorney in releasing
to the press, on the day of petitioner's arrest, certain details of the con-
fession which petitioner made, we find that the transcript of that
confession was read into the record at the preliminary hearing in the
Municipal Court on November 21, four days later. Thus, in any event
the confession would have become available to the press at that
time. . ..-I
Ten years after the decision in Stroble, the Supreme Court of
California had before it a comparable problem in People v. Brommel.6
Once again the district attorney released copies of the confessions
and admissions of defendant to news media prior to the time that they
were admitted into evidence by the court. While the conviction was
reversed because the confession was found to be inadmissible, the
court warned:
During the course of the trial the district attorney released to the
press copies of the confessions and admissions of defendant before they
were admitted into evidence by the court, and even before they had
been made available to defendant and his counsel. The obvious im-
propriety of this conduct is only emphasized by the fact that we have
now determined that these statements were inadmissible against de-
fendant on the trial. Prosecuting officers owe a public duty of fairness
to the accused as well as to the People and they should avoid the
danger of prejudicing jurors and prospective jurors by giving material
to news-disseminating agencies which may be inflammatory or im-
properly prejudicial to defendant's rights. 7
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 192-3.
6 56 Cal. 2d 629, 364 P.2d 845, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961).
7 Id. at 636, 364 P.2d at 849, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
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The most dramatic change in crime reporting which has oc-
curred in recent times has been the result of television news pro-
gramming. Television, bringing for the first time to the public the
concept of "presence," has within a few years caused our greatest
problems and seems likely to create some of our future dilemmas. In
Rideau v. Louisiana,8 the United States Supreme Court met television
head-on. Television lost a major bout.
On February 16, 1961, Wilbert Rideau robbed a bank in Lake
Charles, Louisiana, kidnapped three employees and killed one of
them. A few hours after the robbery Rideau was apprehended by
state troopers and placed in the Calcasieu Parish jail in Lake
Charles. On the night of his arrest he gave extensive written and oral
confessions of the crime to the sheriff and the district attorney. The
following morning Rideau, in company of the Sheriff of Calcasieu
Parish and flanked by the two state troopers who captured him, was
interviewed on television. This interview was shown on local TV sta-
tions on three successive days. Rideau was arraigned two weeks later
and was subsequently tried and found guilty.
Rideau moved for a change of venue under Louisiana proce-
dure on the ground that he could not receive a fair trial in Calcasieu
Parish in light of the televised interview with the sheriff. Three
members of the jury stated on voir dire that they had seen the inter-
view at least once. Two members of the jury were deputy sheriffs
of Calcasieu Parish. Rideau, having exhausted his peremptory chal-
lenges, moved to excuse these jurors for cause, but the challenges
for cause were denied.
In reversing the conviction, the court held that it was not
concerned with the question of who originally initiated the idea of
the televised interview. For, said the court,
we hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request
for a change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had been
exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally
confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged.
For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be
avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who
saw and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trial-at which he
pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court proceedings in a com-
munity so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a
hollow formality.9
Moreover, the court stated that "without pausing to examine a par-
ticularized transcript of the voir dire ...due process . required
8 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
9 Id. at 726.
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a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not
seen and heard .. .(the) televised interview."'"
Justices Clark and Harlan dissented on the ground that no
showing of essential unfairness had been made.
There are several interesting features to this decision. One is
the court's failure to consider the fact that the defense in Rideau
did not establish actual prejudice by the jurors who :tried the case.
The prejudice seemed to be assumed, contrary to Beck v. Washing-
ton" which -held that the burden is always on "him who claims such
injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sus-
tained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality." 2
Rideau also omitted to discuss whether the defendant's confession
was ever received in evidence. It is, of course, no bar to the admissi-
bility of a confession otherwise voluntary that it was televised or
broadcast or published. If Rideau's confession was in fact received
in evidence and seen and heard by the jury in open court, would it
have been of significance that the jurors had seen it two months
earlier?
It may be that California's Brommel3 case, though decided
earlier, gives us the answer, for the court held in effect, as indicated
above, that pretrial release of the confession was per se prejudicial.
There a district attorney was criticized for issuing to the press copies
of a confession which he felt was admissible, which the trial judge
held to be admissible, and which the district court of appeal found
admissible. Reporters sitting in open court could have listened to
the reading of the confession and reported it to their readers. More-
over, prior to trial the confession may have been made known to the
press when the transcript of the proceedings before the grand jury
was filed and became for all practical purposes a public record.
Unless all preliminary proceedings in a criminal case are made secret,
and I know of no one who has made any such proposal, despite the
holding of prejudicial effect it is difficult to understand how pretrial
dissemination of confessions and other evidence can be avoided.
It is clear that if jurors admittedly read newspaper articles
during the trial, it will be treated as prejudicial because the jury is
touched directly. 4 A distinction based on a time factor, that is, cover-
age before trial versus coverage during trial, rests on a slender reed.
For it would seem if courts adhere to the concept that people are
10 Id. at 727.
11 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
12 Id. at 558.
13 People v. Biommee, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 364 P.2d 845, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961).
14 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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impregnated ineradicably, then it matters little if the article is
read before or during the trial.
Nevertheless some state courts have chosen to ignore the im-
plications of Rideau. For example, the recent Vermont ease of State
v. Truman,1" held that
newspaper articles, even though denunciatory in character, are not
in themselves in the absence of some evidence of the actual existence
of a prejudice against the accused, sufficient to require the judge, in
the exercise of his discretion, to'conclude that a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had.16
Other courts have made preventive efforts. In Rochester, New
York, two admitted gamblers recently obtained an injunction to
prevent the local newspaper from pursuing its announced purpose of
publishing personal information and police records of the 29 indi-
viduals in the city who held federal gambling tax stamps, this be-
cause they alleged the publication would make it impossible for them
to receive a fair trial on pending criminal charges."
New York had a "Rideau situation" in People v. Martin.' The
brief per curiam opinion dramatically presents the facts and the
court's emphatic rejection of the police procedure involved:
Defendants have been indicted for murder in the first degree. They
move in this Court . . . for a change of venue. It appears by affidavit
without contradiction that both defendants, 16 years of age, were ar-
rested and brought to the 24th Precinct, where they were booked.
The proceedings before the police lieutenant were filmed and the film
was continued as the defendants were taken to the patrol wagon. On
the way to the patrol wagon both defendants were questioned by re-
porters of the American Broadcasting Company and both the films and
the questioning were telecast over Channel 7. It further appears that
a deputy police commissioner had directed the police officers of the
precinct to give as much cooperation to the press and television re-
porters as possible and specifically authorized the filming. Detectives
engaged in the arrest were authorized to submit to interviews. While
the exact figures of the number of people who saw the telecast is in
doubt, there can be no doubt that it was a very large number and that
the potential for influence on possible talesmen is significant. The effect
of the telecast cannot but be prejudicial. The deputy police commis-
sioner defends his action on the ground that the police should keep the
public informed through the various news media; and further that the
police should not prevent defendants from giving any statement to the
representatives of these media that they might care to give. As applied
to this case, the explanation is ingenuous. Here two very young men, after
first being photographed without their consent, are allowed to be sub-
15 204 A.2d 93 (Vt. 1964).
16 Id. at 96.
'7 N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1964.
18 243 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1963).
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jected to the insistent questioning of reporters bent on getting sensa-
tional details. Defendants far more experienced than these two would
get the impression that their inquisitors were approved by those that
had them in custody and that to rebuff them would not be advisable.
To call this giving them an opportunity to state their version is an ex-
ercise in naivete. The practice defeats the very purpose of police work.
People are not arrested to provide news stories or telecasts. They are
arrested to be brought to justice. Any police conduct that prevents a
fair trial could allow the guilty to escape conviction. Good public re-
lations have their importance but being on good terms with the press
at the expense of a scrupulous performance of the department's func-
tions is hardly commendable. The motion is granted. Settle order on
notice. If defense counsel and the district attorney can agree on a
county for trial, the same may be inserted in the order.' 9
The Martin case vented its criticism on the police. For the
most devastating castigation of journalistic conduct, no case matches
the decision of the United States District Court for Ohio in Sheppard
v. Maxwell.2 °
After a detailed discussion of various newspaper headlines and
articles before and during the trial of Dr. Samuel Sheppard for
murder, the federal court concluded:
If ever there was a trial by newspaper, this is a perfect example.
And the most insidious violator was the Cleveland Press. For some
reason that paper took upon itself the role of accuser, judge and jury.
The journalistic value of its front page editorials, the screaming, slanted
headlines and the nonobjective reporting was nil, but they were calcu-
lated to inflame and prejudice the public. Such a complete disregard for
a sense of propriety results in a grave injustice not only to the indi-
vidual involved but to the community in general. Public officials, the
courts and the jury are unable to perform their proper functions when
the news media run rampant, with no regard for their proper role.
Numerous responsible newspapers and magazines noted this abuse of
freedom of the press and published editorials which were highly critical
of the Cleveland newspapers, especially the Cleveland Press.
Freedom of the press is truly one of the great freedoms which we
cherish; but it cannot be permitted to overshadow the rights of an in-
dividual to a fair trial. As stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in his con-
curring opinion in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53, 71 S. Ct. 549,
550, 95 L. Ed. 740 (1951):
.. . Newspapers, in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights,
may not deprive accused persons of their right to fair trial ...
On this subject, an often quoted opinion is that of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-356,
66 S. Ct. 1029, 1041-1042, 90 L. Ed. 1295 (1945), wherein he stated:
Without a free press there can be no free society. Freedom of
the press, however, is not an end in itself but a means to the end of
19 Id. at 343-4.
20 231 F. Supp. 37 (1964).
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a free society. The scope and nature of the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech must be viewed in that light and in that light
applied ...
A free press is vital to a democratic society because its freedom
gives it power. Power in a democracy implies responsibility in its
exercise. No institution in a democracy, either governmental or private,
can have absolute power. Nor can the limits of power which enforce
responsibility be finally determined by the limited power itself ...
In plain English, freedom carries with it responsibility even for the
press; freedom of the press is not a freedom from responsibility for its
exercise .... [Footnotes omitted.]
By its actions in the Sheppard case, the Cleveland Press showed
no respect for its responsibilities. If ever a newspaper did a disservice
to its profession; if ever the cause of freedom of the press was set
back, this was it. The failure of that newspaper and the two other
Cleveland newspapers to adhere to their responsibilities cannot be per-
mitted to deny petitioner his right to a fair trial. 21
Whatever the ultimate fate of Dr. Sheppard, students of jour-
nalism, and those concerned with fair trial and the free press, should
read the factual recitation in the Sheppard case. One must be com-
pletely shockproof not to be deeply disturbed at the articles, head-
lines, editorials and cartoons, generally exhorting the court and jury
to do their duty, clearly implying that this could be accomplished
only by convicting the defendant.
Justice Blair of New Zealand had this cogent comment on the
press: "It is idle for such newspapers to claim they adopt such
practices in the public interest. Their motive is the sordid one of
increasing their profits, unmindful of the result to the unfortunate
wretch who may ultimately have to stand his trial for murder. 22
Illustrative of how frenzied newspaper coverage can become in a
dramatic situation is the discussion in the report of the Warren Com-
mission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. The constant
crowds of newspaper reporters and television cameras in the police
station were, according to an F.B.I. agent who was present, "not
too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, maybe like
Yankee Stadium during the World Series games."2 Television cam-
eramen set up their cameras and floodlights in the corridors, techni-
cians stretched their television cables in and out of offices, newsmen
wandered into the offices, sat on desks, used police telephones, and
"indeed, one reporter admits hiding a telephone behind a desk so
that he would have exclusive access to it if something developed."24
21 Id. at 63.
22 Attorney General v. Tonks, N.Z.L.R. 141 (1934).
23 Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John
F. Kennedy. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office (1964) at 202.)
24 Ibid.
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A secret service man had the impression that "the press and tele-
vision people just . . . took over."25 This freedom was apparently
pursuant to General Order No. 81 of the Dallas Police Department
which provided in part "that members of this Department render
every assistance . . to the accredited members of the official news-
gathering agencies and this includes newspaper, television camera-
men and newsreel photographers." 6 In a letter to all members of
the Police Department dated February 7, 1963, Chief of Police
Curry explained the previous order as follows: "The General
Order covering this subject is not merely permissive. It does not state
that the Officer may, if he chooses, assist the press. It rather places
on him a responsibility to lend active assistance." '2 7
As -a result of this policy, during the Oswald investigation there
were constant "impromptu and clamorous press conferences in the
third floor corridor. Written press releases were not employed. The
ambulatory press conference became a familiar sight during these
days."2 In fact, so many conflicting statements were given by vari-
ous police officers, and F.B.I. reports given out indiscriminately,
that F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover "became concerned . . . and
dispatched a personal message to Curry requesting him 'not to go
on the air any more until this case . . . [is] resolved'." 9
District Attorney Wade, stating he was concerned because peo-
ple were saying they had the wrong man, "proceeded to hold a
lengthy formal press conference that evening, in which he attempted
to list all of the evidence that had been accumulated at that point
tending to establish Oswald as the assassin of President Kennedy.
' 30
The Warren Commission conceded that the people of the United
States and of the world had a keen interest in learning of the events
surrounding the death of President Kennedy including the develop-
ments of the investigation, but, it concluded,
neither the press nor the public had a right to be contemporaneously
informed by the police or prosecuting authorities of the details of the
evidence being accumulated against Oswald. Undoubtedly the public
was interested in these disclosures but its curiosity should not have
been satisfied at the expense of the accused's right to a trial by an im-
partial jury. The courtroom, not the newspaper or television screen,
is the appropriate forum in our system for the trial of a man accused
of a crime.8 1
25 Id. at 204.
26 Id. at 225.
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 231.
29 Id. at 235-6.
30 Id. at 236.
31 Id. at 240.
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In fact, it suggested if "Oswald had been tried for his murders of
November 22, the effects of the news policy pursued by the Dallas
authorities would have proven harmful both to the prosecution and
the defense.""
In concluding Chapter V of its report the Commission indicated
that
the burden of insuring that appropriate action is taken to establish
ethical standards of conduct for the news media must also be borne
... by State and local governments, by the bar, and ultimately by the
public. The experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a dramatic
affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a proper balance
between the right of the people to be kept informed and the right of
the individual to a fair and impartial trial.33
Where a fair trial is involved, is there any distinction between
a court and a jury? The California Supreme Court has indicated
trial judges, as distinguished from jurors, are impervious to the in-
fluence of news media. In People v. Lichens 4 the court said,
Trial judges often read newspapers, hear radio reports, or even over-
hear conversations or receive unwelcome letters containing statements
relative to a case they are hearing; but if they are qualified for their
office, they disregard all such statements insofar as evidentiary con-
sideration is concerned. The trial judge is as capable of disregarding
these facts as he is of disregarding irrelevant evidence to which he has
sustained objections, or has struck from the record, in a trial to the
court without a jury.35
Parenthetically, while most defendants complain about excesses
of publicity, leave it to California to come up with a case in which
a party appealed because of lack of media attention! In Cembrook
v. Sterling Drug Inc." the plaintiff contended he was denied a public
trial, as guaranteed by Article I, Section 13 of the state Constitution
and Section 686 of the Penal Code, because of a "publicity black-
out" as a result of which no crowds attended the trial and this gave
to the jury an erroneous impression that the case was of minor im-
portance. The appellate court held that "the right to public trial
does not carry with it the concomitant that the trial be publicized in
news media,"3 " and suggested that while the participants may believe
their controversy to be of paramount significance, there can be no
assurance the media will weigh newsworthiness on the same scale.
32 Id. at 238.
33 Id. at 242.
34 59 Cal. 2d 587, 381 P.2d 204, 30 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1963).
85 Id. at 588, 381 P.2d at 205, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
36 231 A.C.A. 77, 41 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1964).
87 Id. at 85, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
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Perhaps the most dramatic turn on this entire subject-cer-
tainly the most widely discussed-was the recent New Jersey Su-
preme Court opinion in State v. Van Duyne8 rendered on November
16, 1964. The New Jersey court ordered prosecutors, policemen and
defense attorneys to cease making statements to the press that
might prejudice fair criminal trials. The judges made clear that they
would enforce the rules with their disciplinary powers over the bar.
"Unfair and prejudicial newspaper stories and comment both
before and during trial of criminal cases," the opinion said, "are be-
coming more and more prevalent throughout the country.""
The court held that, so far as lawyers were concerned, con-
tributing to such prejudicial comment was in conflict with the canons
of professional conduct. Then came the specific restrictions.
"We interpret these canons," the court said, "... to ban state-
ments to news media by prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and their
lawyer staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpatory ad-
missions by the accused, or to the effect that the case is 'open and
shut' against the defendant, and the like, or with reference to the
defendant's prior criminal record, either of convictions or arrests."4
The opinion extended the restriction to policemen who are not
lawyers, and to defense counsel. As to the latter, it said that the
state was as entitled as the defendant to a trial before an impartial
jury.
The New Jersey court sought to reassure the press that no
undue restraints were being imposed. "Fair criminal prosecutions
and exercise of the guarantee of a free press are not incompatible
with the constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial by an im-
partial jury,"41 the court said. "Only the will to recognize and to
subscribe responsibly to that fact has been lacking."4
To return to our original query-upon whom does the ultimate
responsibility for our basic problem rest? The press, radio, and
television may adopt codes or standards of ethics, but at best they
will be voluntary and subject to the whims and caprice of highly
competitive gladiators. Normal sensationalism, solicitation for the
diminishing newspaper market, greed for the expanding television
audience-these and other economic factors will result in abandon-
ment of most voluntary codes under the exigencies of an Oswald,
38 204 A.2d 841 (N.J. 1964).
39 Id. at 851.





Stroble, Chessman, Ma Duncan, Barbara Graham, Burton Abbott
or similar case. "Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine,"43
H.L. Mencken said in 1932. "Essentially, they are as absurd as
would be codes of street-car conductors, barbers or public job-
holders."44
So perhaps we must bow to the inevitability of failure to achieve
voluntary restraint by the media of communication. Assuming so,
is compulsory limitation feasible? In view of the trend of Supreme
Court decisions, from Bridges45 to New York Times v. Sullivan,46
there is grave doubt that the current judicial majority would sit still
for any curbs on the unbridled press. Certainly the political realities
suggest no legislative or executive body would attempt any regula-
tion, assuming a constitutional method could be devised. (Though,
curiously enough, the Chicago Tribune suggested many years ago
that restrictions must come because the "penetration of the police
system and the courts by journalists must stop."47)
That leads us to the bar, prosecutors and defense counsel, and
law enforcement officers. Both are subject to reasonable restraint,
the former by the courts of which they are officers, and the latter
by legislative bodies and in some instances by courts. And, I sub-
mit, that is where appropriate action must be taken.
As Attorney General of California, I suggested a course of
conduct for law enforcement agencies, in the form of six simple intra-
office rules. Many sheriff and police departments in California have
adopted these or similar devices for the conduct of their officers,
and, while the reaction of the press has not been uniformly lauda-
tory, some improvement of reporting procedure has been noted in
subsequent cases of widespread community interest.
The suggested rules, simply stated, were:
1. In the ordinary course of duty, no officer below the rank
of - shall be allowed to make any statement or divulge any in-
formation concerning any felony investigation unless specifically
authorized to do so by -.
2. No officer shall allow his picture to be taken with a prisoner
or someone depicting the prisoner.
3. Unless the person in custody is represented by counsel, and
43 Quoted in footnote, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 365 (1946).
44 Ibid.
45 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
46 374 U.S. 820 (1963).
47 Quoted in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946).
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both the prisoner and counsel give their written consent thereto, no
news media representative shall be allowed to interview the prisoner.
4. Unless the prisoner is represented by counsel and both the
prisoner and counsel agree in writing, no photographs shall be
allowed to be taken of any person in custody.
5. Confessions, admissions, or other statements by the person
in custody, or summaries of them, shall not be released to the news
media representatives by any person. In the unusual case, release
may be authorized by the sheriff or chief of police with the concur-
rence of the district attorney.
6. A designated department employee shall be responsible for
maintaining close liaison with members of news media.
Press critics may complain that we are proposing the English
method of news reporting. There the entire burden falls on the
editor; mere publication regardless of intent subjects him to
contempt.48 Other press editorialists will shrilly cry that the legal
profession seeks a news blackout. I suggest neither is accurate.
I believe the problem of fair trial may be solved if discipline is
directed not at the press, but at law enforcement agencies and
lawyers.
Once police agencies understand that their indifference to rights
of defendants will assuredly result in reversals of convictions, and
thus a waste of all their efforts of apprehension-once they realize
that their blundering may free a desperate criminal, to the ire of
their constituency-they will be less likely to respond to the pres-
sures exerted by media representatives. What most peace officers
need are simple guides of conduct. Whether my suggestions suffice,
or another set may be more desirable, is of no consequence. Some
helpful rules must be prescribed by state Attorneys General, or the
highest ranking police agency in each jurisdiction.
Rules failing, however, it is not impossible to establish authority,
judicially or legislatively, that will subject law enforcement agencies
to contempt process for interfering with the proper administration
of justice. That should be a last resort, of course.
Finally, courts must be prepared to deal firmly with lawyers
who choose to conduct their litigation in the forum of newspaper
columns or television, instead of in the courtroom. Contempt for
interfering with the administration of justice and the functions of
the court must be the big stick available for those prosecutors and
48 See Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARV.
L. REV. 885 (1935).
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defense counsel who issue press releases, bulletins, purported con-
fessions, criminal records, alibis, calculated to influence public
opinion and through it the prospective jury panel.4"
At the 'time of the celebrated Hauptmann trial three decades ago,
the organized bar was disturbed at coverage of trials. It made recom-
mendations then which have largely gone unheeded. ° The advent of
television has compounded the damage that can, and frequently is,
being done to our constitutional concept of fair trial.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the Van Duyne5' case help-
fully warned peace officers and the bar. It is to be hoped other juris-
dictions will be similarly resolute. Perhaps then the current trend
of irresponsibility can be reversed.
49 See Barnes, Constitutional Law: A Changing View Toward Trial by News-
paper, 16 OxrA. L. REv. 337 (1963).
50 22 A.B.A.J. 79 (1936).
51 State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841 (N.J. 1964).
